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PROPOSED RADICAL CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL
TAX MACHINERY
Consideration of Plan Recently Advanced by Mr. Traynor, a Former Adviser to Treasury Department-Because of Drastic Nature of Proposed Departures from Present System, It Should
Be Carefully Studied and Its Effects Considered by Administrators and Lawyers within the
Government and by the Bar Generally-Review of Present Procedure-Criticism of Details of
Proposal-Conclusions

By G.

AARON YOUNGQUIST

Mrcibcr Coiniittce on Federal Taxation; Formner Assistant U. S. Attorney
General in Charge of Tax Matters.

tive and judicial machinery
administrastudyforofthethedetermination
COMPREHENSIVE
of federal income, estate and gift tax liabilities
and a "critical appraisal of the extent to which that
machinery has failed to function as it was intended and
the reasons for that failure" has recently been made
public* by Professor Roger John Traynor of the University of California School of Jurisprudence. He proposes radical changes in the present machinery, affecting not only the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but also
the United States Board of Tax Appeals and the district and appellate courts. Because Professor Traynor
has lately served as an adviser to the Treasury Department, the drastic nature of the proposed departures
from the present system should provoke a careful study
of the plan and a consideration of its effects by administrators and lawyers within the government, and by the
Bar generally as well as members of it regularly representing taxpayers. The adoption of a plan like the
one advanced by Professor Traynor would have the
double effect of upsetting well established practices in
the field of tax law and of signalizing the application of
like changes in the functioning of other administrative
departments and the procedure for judicial review.
A brief review of the present procedure before the
Bureau, the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts is
necessary to an understanding of the proposals for
change. That relating to the determination of income
taxes will suffice.
The taxpayer makes an annual return, the effect
of which is to assess a tax against him in the amount
it shows to be due. The return is audited in the revenue office or in the field. If the audit indicates that
the net income is understated informal conferences
usually are had, and if they do not serve to iron out the
difference the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge in
-the taxpayer's district issues notice proposing a deficiency assessment. The taxpayer may file a protest
setting forth, among other things, a specification of the
items against which he protests and a statement of the
grounds upon which the protest is based. He may have
a hearing on his protest at the local revenue office. If
agreement is not reached he may have a further hearing before the Bureau at Washington (except as this
*Columbia Law Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. 8, pages 1393-

1435.

procedure has recently been altered by decentralization,
later referred to). If that hearing does not settle the
controversy, a letter of assessment issues and the taxpayer may then follow either of two courses: he may
pay the tax, file a claim for refund and, if it be not
allowed, sue for the refund in the District Court or in
the Court of Claims; or he may, without paying the
tax, petition for a redetermination by the Board of
Tax Appeals. Under the first procedure the decision
of the District Court is reviewable by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, and the decisions of that court and of the
Court of Claims are reviewable by the Supreme Court
upon writ of certiorari. Under the second procedure,
the decision of the Board is reviewable by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the decision of that court is likewise reviewable by the Supreme Court upon writ of
certiorari. Choice of the Board procedure precludes
subsequent suit for refund after the payment of the tax.
The principal changes proposed may be grouped
under these heads:
(1) Protest Procedure. A protest must set forth
all relevant facts, evidentiary as well as ultimate, list
all relevant books and documents and give their whereabouts, and list the names of all persons having knowledge of the facts. The Commissioner's final notice of
deficiency must contain specific findings of fact.
(2) Board Procedure. The present Board would
be split up into five parts or divisions, each functioning
separately in its own geographical district. As a condition precedent to redetermination by the Board, the
taxpayer would be required to give a bond to secure
the payment of the full amount of the deficiency asserted. The taxpayer apparently would be limited on
review to the grounds, facts, documents, etc., set out in
his protest. The Commissioner would be limited to the
issues and findings set out in his notice of deficiency.
The Board would be limited to the issues presented by
the Commissioner's findings and the burden would be
on the taxpayer to prove the Commissioner's findings
and conclusions erroneous.
(3) Judicial Review. Review of Board decisions
by the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would be abolished.
Decisions of the five Boards would be reviewed exclusively by a Court of Tax Appeals sitting in Washington whose decisions would be reviewable by the
Supreme Court only upon writ of certiorari. As an
291
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alternative proposal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or the Court of Claims might act as
a Court of Tax Appeals.
(4) Refunds. The Boards of Tax Appeals would
be given exclusive jurisdiction over claims for refund
under procedure similar to that applicable to deficiencies. Suits against collectors in the District Courts and
against the United States in the Districts Court and
Court of Claims would be abolished.
The limitations of time and space prohibit a detailed analysis of the proposals and the specific differences between them and the present procedure, but the
foregoing summaries present the contrast. The most
that can be done is to discuss in brief and general fashion the strength and the weaknesses of the present system as compared with those of the one suggested.
1. PROTEST PROCEDURE.
(a) Generally. No change would occur in the proceedings prior to the notice of deficiency and the protest.
Informal conferences between the Revenue
Agent and the taxpayer would occur and would result
in the supplying of information and in discussions
which in many instances would. satisfy the taxpayer
that he has understated his income or convince the
Agent that the suggested deficiency is non-existent.
The contents and service of the deficiency notice would
not vary materially from the method now used, except
that perhaps the time permitted for filing a protest
would be longer by reason of the vastly greater burden
and responsibility that the proper preparation of the
protest would entail. Specifying grounds for the exceptions as required by the present practice necessarily
involves a statement of the ultimate facts upon which
the taxpayer relies to maintain his protest and a reference to the controlling provisions of the statute or
the regulations. Thus the Bureau is fully apprised of
the basis of taxpayer's contentions.
The protest presently required may consist of a
brief statement of contentions and facts, or it may
assume the proportions of a full-grown brief on the
facts and the law. That is a matter of choice with the
taxpayer, and properly so if he is to have the privilege
of presenting his own protest rather than go to the
expense of employing an expert to do it for him. And
there are many instances, especially those involving
only fact or accounting questions, in which the taxpayer
may and does properly and effectively present his own
case. The taxpayer is not limited either in his discussions with the Bureau or later in preparing his petition
for redetermination by the Board and presenting his
evidence to the points or the facts set forth in his protest. Those limitations begin with his petition for
redetermination, which in effect takes the place of a
pleading in a judicial proceeding. Since the protest
procedure is preliminary and informal in character and
is intended to afford an opportunity for presenting
the facts and negotiating a settlement, it would seerm
entirely proper that the instrument by which it is initiated should be simple and non-technical. The effectiveness of the present procedure is indicated by the settlement during the fiscal year 1937-1938 of 140,000 in
the field and 51,000 in the Income Tax Unit of the
deficiencies that had been found due. This compares
with 211,000 deficiencies recommended during that
year and is equal to more than 907o of the total number.
By contrast the protest suggested would include
(a) the grounds of protest, item by item; (b) the
relevant facts (presumably all the facts), both evidentiary and ultimate; (c) a list of relevant documents,

books, papers, etc., with a description sufficient to identify them and their whereabouts; and (d) the names
and addresses of persons having knowledge of the facts
stated in the protest, together with a brief statement of
their connection with the transactions involved. While
the taxpayer would have the right to amend his protest before the Commissioner makes his final determination thereon, he would nevertheless, in the proceeding
before the Board, be restricted to the contentions made
and the facts stated in the protest, except that for good
cause shown the taxpayer may, at the discretion of the
Board-but not as a matter of right-present additional
facts or new theories. Correspondingly the Commissioner would be limited to his findings and conclusions.
The object of the amplified protest of the taxpayer
and the findings of the Commissioner is to require full
disclosure and adequate consideration while the matter
is still in the administrative stage. The object is a
laudable one, but the experience of most practitioners
before the Bureau is that the same object is achieved
under the present practice. Undoubtedly there are exceptions, but for the most part the taxpayer finds it
advantageous and wise to make a complete presentation
of his facts and contentions and the Commissioner to
give them full consideration. The settlement in the
administrative stages of nine-tenths of the deficiencies
proposed is persuasive evidence of the effectiveness of
the present method.
The new form of protest would in many cases
impose a tremendous burden on the taxpayer, especially in its requirement that it set out all the evidentiary facts and all of the source material, both documents and persons. The inclusion in the protest of
such matter would often increase its volume enormously, and by way of precaution would require the insertion of much that in the final sifting out would prove
irrelevant and useless.
It constitutes a startling
departure from the known forms of procedure. Not
even in the more formal and dignified proceedings of
courts is anything required that calls for so thorough a
preliminary investigation and so meticulous a statement
of facts and theories as does the suggested protest.
Without doubt it would often serve as a trap in which
the unwary would find themselves caught when they
came before the Board, and the Commissioner might
well often find his chances of success before the Board
nullified by some inadequacy of finding or omission
of theory in his determinations. Nor could he, after
the case comes before the Board, assert additional deficiencies as he may do under the present statute, thus
losing the benefit to the government of some increase
in income from that source.
(b) Decentralization of the Bureau. One of the
main criticisms of the Bureau procedure is that the
machinery for administrative review is too elaborate
and there is a multiplicity of hearings and conferences
in the field and in Washington. There is basis for the
criticism, but much of the basis should disappear with
the decentralization of the reviewing activities of the.
bureau that is now going on. Five field divisions of
the Technical Staff-New England, New York, Central, Chicago and Pacific-with offices at sixteen points
have already been established, and others are under
way. Each division is staffed by technical advisers,
attorneys and other experts. The audits of returns, the
proposal of deficiencies by the Internal Revenue Agent
in Charge, and hearings on protests by his office, will
proceed as before; but if the controversy has not been
adjusted by the time that procedure has been gone
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through the taxpayer may have it transferred to the
appropriate field division of the Technical Staff for
further hearing and consideration. The division's determination of the taxpayer's liability is final. It will
not be reconsidered by the Bureau at Washington and
it is reviewable only upon a petition to the Board of
Tax Appeals. Thus the taxpayer, instead of carrying
his controversy through the various divisions and sections in Washington after first having had it considered
by the local office, will obtain a final determination oy
the division of the Technical Staff established in nis
own region. Experience with decentralization will undoubtedly disclose defects in the system, such, for instance, as conflicts in treatment of like questions by
different divisions; but the experiment will be watched
with interest by everyone affected both within the government and without, and if the hopes of its proponents
are realized it will go a long way toward eliminating
the complications and delays attendant upon the present procedure.
It must be remembered that the notice, the protest
and the hearing are purely administrative and non-judicial in character and are intended to bring about an
agreement between the Commissioner and the taxpayer.
In view of that purpose, they should proceed with such
degree of informality as will enable the disputants not
only to exchange views and facts but also to negotiate
settlement by concessions on the part of one or both.
To require participants in a decidedly informal administrative proceeding to adhere to highly formal and
rather burdensome methods involving definitive and
inclusive pleadings, findings and conclusions would
seem to defeat the very purpose of the administrative
proceeding, whether it be conducted in a central or in
a decentralized office.
2. BOARD OF TAX APPEALS PROCEDURE.
(a) Generally. When the taxpayer files his petition for -redetermination of tax liability by the Board,
he is free to set up all of the objections to the proposed
assessment of which he is then aware and, reciprocally,
the Commissioner may not only assert whatever deficiencies he then has but may also claim additional
deficiencies. Neither is restricted by the positions taken
or limited by the facts developed in the notice or the
protest or the hearings. Under the proposed plan the
taxpayer would be limited in his proof before the
Board to the grounds, the documents and the facts set
out in his protest, and the Commissioner would be
limited to the issues and facts contained in his findings
and conclusions. With respect to the scope of the
Board's review, the suggestion is that it would be
limited to the issues presented by the findings and that
the taxpayer "would be required to prove . . . that the
Commissioner's findings and conclusions were erroneous." Ordinarily the only burden on the taxpayer is
that he show that the assessment is erroneous; but if
Professor Traynor's words mean what they say the
taxpayer must successfully controvert the facts upon
which the Commissioner's assessment is based and
must undertake to do so without being advised of the
sources from which they come and without opportunity
to cross-examine the persons who may have supplied the
information upon which the finding rests.
These limitations would prevent the Commissioner
from showing that while a deficiency asserted by him
on the basis of one item was erroneous, nevertheless
the liability should be imposed because of an understaterfnent of income arising from some other item, and
conversely the taxpayer would be prevented from off-
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setting the understatement on which the proposed deficiency is based by showing an overstatement of an
equal or greater amount in some other item. The plan
proposes that if the Board takes a different view of the
facts or the law from that taken by the parties to the
administrative proceeding, or if in the interval between
the findings and the hearing before the Board the
courts should place a new construction upon the law,
the parties might then be permitted to assert theories
and prove facts not contained in the protest or the
findings. But this would not be a matter of right. It
would be permitted only when the litigant is able to
convince the Board that there is good cause for relaxing the rule.
The purpose of the restrictions is to make compulsory an all-inclusive showing by the taxpayer and
an expressed consideration of every fact by the Commissioner. Professor Traynor suggests that if this
sanction proves ineffectual others must be found. The
abstract desirability of that result may be conceded;
but if its achievement places too onerous a burden on
the taxpayer and by a process of formalization robs
the administrative procedure of its present opportunities for man-to-man negotiation and adjustment, then
more will be lost than gained.
It is time enough to formalize the proceeding when
it reaches the Board, and it is not wise to hamper the
preliminary settlement procedure by vesting the Commissioner with quasi-judicial powers, which would
happen under the proposed plan.
(b) Decentralization of the Board. The Board of
Tax Appeals now holds hearings in Washington and
on "circuit." The times and places for circuit hearings
follow a fixed schedule which is of course subject to
change whenever the press of business or the convenience of the taxpayers or the Commissioner require it.
The Board is divided into sixteen divisions, each member comprising a division. Save in exceptional cases,
the hearing is conducted by a single member who makes
his findings and conclusions. Any case may be (by
request), and most cases of importance are, reviewed
by the entire Board. This system serves the convenience of the taxpayers and produces uniformity of
decision.
There are few districts in the country the business in which would call for the continuous presence
of three Board members as proposed by the new plan.
Some advantages doubtless would accrue from permanence of a board within a particular district, such as
conveniencing the taxpayers and training the members
in problems peculiar to the region. But the taxpayers
are served now with reasonable adequacy, and whenever need arises more members could be assigned or
more frequent hearings had in a particular area. Indeed, the present personnel of sixteen members, all of
them available for service whenever and wherever
needed, supplies a more flexible instrument for the
hearing and disposition of cases than would a number
of boards limited in personnel and restricted in area.
A change along the lines proposed would seem just as
likely to retard as to expedite the closing of dockets.
A far more serious problem arises with respect to
the uniformity of decisions as among the several
boards. It is claimed that decentralization could be
accomplished without imperilling uniformity, but this
appears to be a mere assertion, unless it is based on the
assumption that one board is to be bound by the precedent set by any other. Since the plan contemplates that
each board or division shall function as a separate unit,
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it must also contemplate that each unit will arrive at
its own decisions. If the decision of one board shall
constitute a binding precedent upon all the others, the
result would be that on important questions of law,
whether statutory or constitutional, the taxpayers will
have the benefit of the experience and wisdom of only
three men, because the twelve comprising the other four
divisions are not free to exercise their own judgment
or arrive at their own conclusions, but are bound by
another's decision. If quasi-judicial functions are to
be exercised by boards co-equal in jurisdiction and
authority, each must necessarily act according to its
own lights and arrive at its own independent conclusions.
It is suggested that the boards be under the supervision of the Court of Tax Appeals; but obviously
supervision cannot extend to controlling the operation
of intelligent and informed minds upon law and fact
questions entrusted to them for determination. In the
very nature of things it must be anticipated that five
groups of men, especially when they do not have the
benefit of mutual discussion and exchange of ideas, will
often arrive at different conclusions. The likelihood
of conflict is strongly indicated by the numerous dissents appearing in the reports of the present Board.
When it is remembered that these occur after joint
consideration and opportunity for personal discussion,
it seems clear that conflicts among the proposed threeman boards would be frequent occurrences. The resulting conflicts would make the work of the Commissioner harder even than it is now. A decision of the
present Board naturally carries with it authority, and
the Commissioner abides by that decision unless he
feels that the interests of the government are unduly
jeopardized by it, in which case he indicates by a "nonacquiescence" his intention to disregard it and follow
his own interpretation of the law. Now he has a single
tribunal to agree or disagree with, and he will disagree
only in cases of importance; but with five separate
boards he will be confronted with the necessity when
one board disagrees with another to express his nonacquiescence with one or the other in every such instance, whether the question decided is important or
not.
Someone might suggest that the decision of a decentralized division of the board be followed by the decentralized bureau within the area of the board's district, even though it conflicts with decisions of the
other boards. But that would hardly tend toward uniformity in the administration of tax law. The answer
might also be made that the Commissioner is faced
with a similar difficulty now by reason of conflicts between the Circuit Courts of Appeals. That is true,
and it is one of the serious defects of the present system; but it must be remembered that the possibility of
those conflicts lies in the relatively small number of
cases that reach the Courts of Appeals, whereas under
the separate board system the possibility would be several times multiplied because of the larger number of
board decisions. There will be enough headaches in
the Bureau over conflicts among its decentralized divisions, and conflicts in decisions of the boards would
serve only to aggravate Bureau perplexities.
(c) The Bond on Appeal. An unfortunate result of the delay in litigating tax cases before payment
is the loss of revenues to the government. All agree
that every citizen should discharge his tax liability to
the extent of his means and that frivolous appeals and
dilatory tactics should not be permitted to diminish
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the public revenues. Undoubtedly some loss is due to
the delay attendant upon appeals to the board, but the
nature of the case makes it impossible to determine
what part of the failure of collection in cases determined
by the Board is due to the passage of time and what
part to other causes. Professor Traynor points out
that during the fiscal year 1936-1937 some $16,000,000
in taxes, penalties and interest was assessed upon the
closing of dockets by decisions of the Board or on
appeal, and that during the same year the government
failed to collect some $1,750,000 that had been assessed after decision by the Board in income tax cases
involving $10,000 or more. The latter figure is a little
more than 11 per cent of the former, but no figures
are given, and probably none can be given, showing to
what extent uncollectibility resulted from the appeal
to the Board. Nor are figures available with respect
to failure of collection in cases that are not appealed
to the Board. Probably the percentage of loss would
be lower, but the comparison would be interesting and
might be illuminating.
Whatever the situation may be in this respect, the
fact is that the Revenue Act gives the Commissioner all
powers necessary to protect the government's interest.
He may make a jeopardy assessment whenever in his
judgment the facts warrant it, and he may make such
assessment at any time during the pendency of the
case before the Board and until the decision of the
Board has become final or until the taxpayer has filed
a petition for review by the Circuit Court of Appeals
(Revenue Act 1938, section 273 (e) ). From that
point on the protection against non-collectibility is continued by the requirement that a taxpayer seeking
review of a Board decision must, as a condition to
appeal, provide a bond conditioned upon the payment
of the deficiency finally determined.
The entire purpose of the Board review is to give
the taxpayer the chance of a quasi-judicial consideration without first being obliged to pay the tax. In
many cases that purpose would be wholly defeated if
taxpayer were required to give bond, for, while he
may be fully solvent, the burden of the bonding procedure with the payment of premiums as well as interest upon the deficiency, if it be finally established,
and sometimes the giving of indemnifying security to
the surety, would be so great as to compel him to pay
the tax and take his chance on a refund. The man
who is able to give bond is also able to pay the tax
without too great an inconvenience. The bond requirement would make redetermination by the Board the
rich man's privilege and would in many instances exclude from its benefits the "little fellow," of whom
there are many, as indicated by the fact that on June
30, 1938, 57.4 per cent of the dockets pending before
the Board or before the courts reviewing its decisions
involved deficiencies of less than $5,000.
Under the federal revenue procedure there is no
point at which the government is not fully securedby the right of jeopardy assessments throughout the
period of administrative (including Board) consideration, and by bond on appeal to the court. It should
not be forgotten that the Board is, after all, not a
court, but an agency in the executive branch of the
government charged with making an administrative
determination for that branch. It would be wholly
inconsistent with administrative precedents to require
that a taxpayer give bond as a prerequisite to administrative consideration of his contention. Such is not
the general state practice, and taking all things into
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account the federal government is better equipped
through its numerous agencies throughout the country
to protect its revenues than are the states. The suggestion that a bond shall be the price of consideration
by the executive department of an honest denial of tax
liability comes as something of a shock even to the
lawyer who is not unfamiliar with technical requirements on judicial review, and will undoubtedly be a
severer shock to the layman taxpayer when he hears
about it.
Statistics given by Professor Traynor relative to
the disposition of deficiencies pending before the Board
prove the injustice of a bond requirement. Of the
deficiencies involved in cases closed by the Technical
Staff in the fiscal year 1937-1938 65.8 per cent were
conceded; in those closed by the Appeals Division
69.1 per cent were conceded and in those decided by
the Board 88.4 per cent were disallowed. The corresponding averages for the three fiscal years ended with
1938 were 64.4 per cent, 68.6 per cent and 74.2 per
cent. From this it appears that after conferences in the
field and in the Income Tax Unit had eliminated unwarranted claims, and after the Technical Staff and the
Appeals Division had again winnowed out the chaff,
nevertheless the Board found that the taxpayer was
right and the Commissioner wrong in 75 per cent of the
deficiencies claimed. Undoubtedly the more thorough
Bureau consideration that is proposed would reduce that
percentage, but even if it were cut in two, which is as
much as could be expected, the requirement of a bond
would be an unwarranted penalty upon the right to
review.
3. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Under the present method the taxpayer or the
Commissioner may file a petition for review of a Board
determination by the Court of Appeals of the circuit
in which the taxpayer resides or, upon stipulation, by
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. The
proposal is that review of Board determinations be
confined to a single Court of Tax Appeals or, alternatively, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia or the Court of Claims (which however is a
trial and not an appellate court).
The criticism of the present method rests on sound
basis. Like questions are not infrequently given conflicting answers in the different circuits. Not only the
Commissioner, as pointed out by Professor Traynor,
but the taxpayers as well are troubled by the conflicts
that inevitably occur. Pending determination of a
conflict between circuits the Commissioner and the
Board must choose one or the other; and where a question has been decided by one circuit, or by several
with the same result, and the answer is in conflict with
the views of the Commissioner or the Board, or both,
they must choose whether to accept the Court's view
or follow their own. The latter objection is not a
serious one, because a Court of Appeals' decision is
substantial authority and is so regarded by other courts
of equal rank and may well be so regarded by the
Commissioner and the Board. Disagreement between
the circuits is the exception rather than the rule; and,
while the government's following a single decision or a
series of agreeing decisions later reversed by the Supreme Court may have caused a loss of revenue meanwhile-and incidentally may have cost taxpayers
money if the taxpayer instead of the government was
on the short end-the dangers of loss of revenue as the
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result of subsequent reversals, while not insubstantial,
are not so great as to condemn the system.
It is true that when a court overrules the Commissioner he often seeks decision by other courts for the
purpose of creating a conflict, and thereby causes inconvenience and annoyance to himself as well as to
the taxpayers. The justification is that he seeks deficiencies on the same ground against numerous other
taxpayers residing in several circuits. But, after all,
how far should the Commissioner go in an effort to
overturn the judgment of a court of authority as high
as that of a Court of Appeals ?
Where conflict between courts does exist the remedy is simple and speedy, for under the rules of the
Supreme Court certiorari is invariably granted to resolve it. Keeping other cases open while the conflict
lasts works no great hardship on either the Commissioner or the taxpayer.
The proposal is that all reviews of Board determinations be diverted from the eleven Courts of Appeal
and concentrated in a single Court of Tax Appeals in
Washington. This would have the advantage of eliminating conflicts among courts; but as has already been
pointed out, conflicts among divisions of the Board
would take the place of conflicts among the courts, and
the end result would be not far from the starting point.
Indeed the conflicts might well be much more numerous than they are now. The Board now decides six
or seven times as many tax cases as do the Courts of
Appeals, and even though the new procedure should
cut down the number of petitions to the Board it would
still be great enough to give rise to conflicts among
divisions of the Board well in excess of the present
conflicts among the Courts of Appeals.
The suggestion is made that the judicial structure
in tax cases would then resemble "a single judicial
district, where the decisions of a number of federal
district courts of original jurisdiction are reviewed by
one Circuit Court of Appeals." From an administrative standpoint that would seem a desirable system,
but from the viewpoint of the taxpayer and his lawyer
it smacks of over-concentration and centralization. Subjecting the district courts of a circuit to appellate review by a single court works very well, but it must be
remembered that instead of one court with nationwide
jurisdiction there are ten circuits, each with its own
appellate court. Each circuit is, broadly speaking, an
appropriate judicial unit by reason of the at least geographical unity of its population and the indigenous
quality of many of the legal questions arising within
its borders, such as mineral law, admiralty law, commercial law, and others, and by reason of the restricted
area it serves its inhabitants conveniently and expeditiously.
Of course a single court of review would make for
uniformity and removal of conflicts. But that is not
the paramount purpose of jurisprudence. The paramount purpose is that the ultimate decision be the
right one. The achievement of that end is far more
probable if several groups of intelligent men apply
their learning and intellect to a given problem than if
only one group applies itself to it. And if the several
groups agree, that generally settles the question; if
they disagree the doubt is almost inevitably of sufficient gravity to call for a decision by the highest court
of the land. That decision, as has been pointed out,
invariably follows and resolves any conflict that may
arise among the circuits, and when the last word has
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been spoken the litigant and all others with like interest accept it without question, whether they agree with
it or not.

The assertion may safely be ventured that federal
tax litigation is as extensive and important as that of
any other single class. That being so the litigants, the
government as well as the taxpayer, are entitled to a
thorough and comprehensive judicial investigation of
its problems by the constitutional courts. That is afforded by the present method of review. A single
court, whether it be the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, the Court of Claims, or a special
Court of Tax Appeals, would naturally consist of a
limited number of judges who, regardless of the
breadth of their experience, would in the aggregate be
less well qualified than the combined ability of the
judges of the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Whichever court were chosen for tax appeals, it
would almost necessarily sit only in Washington.
While the government would be convenienced, taxpayers residing at distant points would be subjected to
substantial expense and their counsel to considerable
inconvenience.
The disposition of appeals would
hardly be expedited, for according to the report of the
October 1938 Conference of Senior Circuit Judges
the Circuit Courts of Appeals are generally up with their
work, and the considerable increase in the personnel
of those courts within the past three years will tend
to speed up even more the disposition of cases.
It is believed by many that further concentration
in Washington of governmental affairs is not in the
best interests of the country. The governmental environment and the constant and almost exclusive contact with bureaus and agencies of the central government and residents of the capitol city have their ultimate effect upon the trend of thought. Governmental
officers and especially those of the judiciary should be
exposed to intercourse with the people at large. That
is one of the advantages of the Bureau's present program of decentralization, and transformation of judicial review from its present decentralized state to a
centralized one looks like a step backward.
Although as pointed out by Professor Traynor
only 9.4 per cent of the tax cases in the Circuit Courts
of Appeals during a given period involved questions
of local law, that number is nevertheless substantial
enough to weigh in favor of consideration by courts
within the local jurisdiction. The suggestion is made
that members of divisions of the Board would undoubtedly be appointed from within the division area
and would be competent to decide issues turning on a
construction of local law. But that does not answer
the objection that the body of appellate jurisdiction in
such cases, being limited in number and sitting in
Washington, would not be as well qualified in that
particular as the judges of the circuits. In addition to
questions of local law there are also questions of general
law not at all peculiar to tax cases. Placing tax
controversies wholly in special tax tribunals may well
result in the development of an artificial fiscal law. It
is neither advisable nor feasible to place tax law in a
compartment apart from the great body of general
law and fact issues that are involved in almost
every tax controversy and thus promote the development on the part of tribunals of a specialized tax attitude rather than the more realistic view that will flow

from the consideration of cases at large and from contact with the public at large.

4. REFUNDS.
In lieu of petitioning the Board of Tax Appeals
for redetermination of an assessment proposed by the
Commissioner, or in any case where the taxpayer has
made an overpayment on his self-declared assessment,
the taxpayer may, after paying the tax, file a claim for
refund and, if the Commissioner rejects it, bring an
action against the United States in the Court of Claims,
or against the Collector (or, with certain limitations,
against the United States) in the District Courts, to
recover the claimed overpayment.
The annual averages of claims for refund of income taxes for the three fiscal years ended with 1938
were 44,066 claims filed and 42,141 claims closed. During the same period the annual average of actions for
refund brought in the District Courts was 362, and
in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1937, 139 were
terminated by trial. Data on the number brought
in the Court of Claims is not available, but
that number was substantially less as indicated
by the figures given below. The average number of actions for refunds (including estate and
gift taxes as well as income taxes) closed in the District Courts in the three fiscal years ended with 1937
was 422, and in the Court of Claims 143. From this
it appears that nearly 99 per cent of the refund cases
are settled in the Bureau without litigation, and that
the number of petitions to the Board on deficiencies is
about ten times as great as the number of actions for
refunds. So the problems of litigation in refund matters are negligible in comparison with those attendant
upon the review of deficiencies.
The Board has no jurisdiction over refunds except that it may find an overpayment with respect to
the particular year under review upon the deficiency
asserted by the Commissioner. The American Bar
Association has recommended that the Board be given
jurisdiction concurrently with the courts over refund
claims presented to and rejected by the Commissioner.
Professor Traynor's proposal is that the District Courts
and the Court of Claims be divested of jurisdiction of
actions to recover tax overpayments, and that the
Board be given exclusive jurisdiction to review all
refund claims rejected by the Commissioner after proceedings within the Bureau like those had with respect
to deficiencies, with the Board's decision subject to review by a Court of Tax Appeals.
There seems to be no particular reason for vesting
the Court of Claims with jurisdiction over actions for
refunds except that it deals exclusively with claims
against the government. The action in the District
Courts against collectors is an ancient remedy, and actions against the United States are permitted by the
Tucker Act. The taxpayer may, in any case, sue the
Collector or the representatives of his estate and is
not restricted to an action against the United States
unless he chooses to proceed in the Court of Claims.
All actions against the United States are triable by the
court without a jury; and it is true, as pointed out by
Professor Traynor, that there are few jury trials of
actions brought against Collectors or their representatives. But it would seem only fair that the right of
trial by jury should be preserved to those who wish
to avail themselves of it-the government itself did so
in the Astor case-and that right would be destroyed

(Continued on page 353)
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legislation which covers all details. To avoid rigidities
which might be seriously disrupting, there should be
some discretion in the working out of detailed rules.
Furthermore, there would seem to be little serious objection to administrative tribunals, within their respective fields, exercising the prerogative of "judicial legislation" which has heretofore been exercised primarily
by the courts. The intimate and specialized knowledge possessed by administrative tribunals seems peculiarly to fit them to play this role. It may also be that
certain judicial or quasi-judicial matters should, in the
first instance, be decided by the administrative tribunal,
particularly if the applicable principle of solution must
be drawn from a knowledge of the field as a whole. On
the other hand, there are certain types of prosecutory
proceedings where guilt or innocence depends upon
the omission or commission of certain acts and the
absence or presence of certain intents, where there
would seem to be little reason for the commission acting as both the prosecutor and judge. Such cases,
however, represent but a small fraction of the activities
of administrative bodies, and certainly they are not in
themselves sufficient reasons for opposing generally the
administrative process.
An evolutionary remolding of certain administrative procedures is certainly desirable. To an extent
this can be accomplished by internal changes, such as
we have referred to, possible within the scope of existing statutes. To some extent statutory amendments
may be required. If so, these matters can be frankly
discussed, first. with the commission in question, then
with the Congress. Wherever it is felt that excessive
and unnecessary power has been conferred, the Congress can be asked frankly to curtail that power. Such
procedure is certainly more worthy and more apt to
be effective than blanket efforts, by measures of indirection, to cripple the entire administrative process.

Proposed Radical Changes in
Federal Tax Machinery
(Continued froi page 296)
if exclusive jurisdiction were vested in the Board. The
right to go to a constitutional court is an effective safeguard even though it be not often used.
Furthermore it seems clear that an unlawful exaction by a Collector gives rise to a cause of action
against him personally. That being so, the due process
guaranteed by the 5th Amendment to the federal Constitution would seem to entitle the taxpayer to resort
to a constitutional court. The decision of the Supreme Court in Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409,
430-431, and the earlier cases cited in that opinion,
call for that conclusion-and it is reenforced by the
sharp reaction of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Holmes against the suggestion made by government
counsel on the argument of the Graham case that the
action against the Collector was not a personal one but
in reality one against the United States.

CONCLUSION.
Federal tax procedure affects directly more citizens than does any other activity of the national government. The present procedure, while not without
its faults, works reasonably well. It places no undue
burden upon the government or the taxpayer. It permits the taxpayer to have his case tried or reviewed by

PE)EAi,

'AX

MAClINERY

353

constitutional courts of his locality, and the personnel
of the offices of the United States Attorneys and the
Department of Justice enable the government to present its side without hardship or excessive expense.
The present Board of Tax Appeals is only thirteen
years old, a brief period in the life of a nation, and
while the present procedure of the Bureau and the
Board may give rise to some inconvenience and delay
and the present method of review to some inconsistencies, most of these defects can be cured without so
radical a remedy as that proposed.
Many of the petitions to the Board are due to the
giving of notices of deficiency near the end of the period limiting the time for assessment, with the result
that too little time remains for adequate presentation
and consideration of a protest. Many others are due
to the Commissioner's refusal to accept opinion evi(lence on values or to consider certain issues with
respect to which he has established a rule adverse to
the taxpayer's contention. The timely issuance of
notices and liberalization of the Commissioner's attitude upon the evidence and issues referred to would go
far toward cutting down the number of petitions. The
large percentage of settlements made by the Technical
Staff and the Appeals Division so indicates.
With respect to the Board there is not, as claimed,
any "present slow-moving jam of cases." While in
the past the Board's docket has been overloaded, the
number of pending cases was reduced from 20,017 in
May, 1931, to only 6,306 on March 24, 1939, and the
number may be divided among the sixteen members. In the fiscal year 1936-1937 5,043 cases
were closed as against 4,055 new petitions filed, and
in the following year 5,799 as against 4,912, making
the docket practically current. When it is considered
that 85 per cent of the income taxes are collected upon
the taxpayer's self-assessment in his return, and that
of the more than six million returns made annually
only 5,000, or less than one-tenth of one per cent, find
their way to the Board, complaints of excessive litigation of federal taxes seem unjustified.
If there be overmuch tax litigation, may not the
fault lie rather with the frequent changes made in the
Revenue Acts by the Congress, and the absence of adeqluate hearings upon and sufficient consideration of
proposed amendments, and the extension of Revenue
Acts beyond revenue purposes? Taking all things into
account, the wise course to follow might well be to
await the completion and development of the decentralization of the Bureau and the passage of time to
permit the settling of the form and content of the principal parts of the taxing statutes.

De Profundis
"It is certain that many members, old and young,
have ideas based on their particular experiences which
would interest our readers. We have from time to
time urged the contribution of such ideas, but, unhappily, to very little purpose. We say again, most
emphatically, that the Bulletin positively craves contributions-long or short. If this little journal published by the Association could become a journal of
discussion with many contributors, it would be of far
greater value and interest, to say nothing of the relief
it would be to the editor to sit back and never put pen
to paper."-Bar Bulletin (Boston)

